Articles Posted in Environmental

On Friday, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declined to entertain EPA’s argument that it could dictate venue for review of its decision by including within the decision that it would have “nationwide scope or effect.” Pursuant to Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, venue over challenges to EPA actions lie exclusively with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia only if (1) the final action taken by EPA is “nationally applicable” or (2) EPA found that its final action was based on a determination of “nationwide scope or effect” and it published this finding. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, in Dalton Trucking, Inc., et al., v. EPA, et al., held that venue was not proper in the District of Columbia and dismissed the petitions for review of EPA’s authorization of the California Air Resources Board (CARB) regulations.

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For several years, EPA has encouraged the regulated community to audit their facilities for compliance with environmental laws, and to self-disclose to EPA any violations noted in the audit to obtain reductions to or even eliminate altogether civil penalties if the report is made on a timely basis and demonstrates that the violations are being corrected promptly. These policies were announced in April 2000 with a special policy made available to small businesses (the Small Business Compliance Policy). In 2008, the benefits of the policy were extended to new owners to encourage them to undertake an environmental audit of the facilities they were purchasing to address and correct existing environmental violations and to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the Audit Policy to embark upon a “fresh start” with EPA. The result of these polices was to dramatically expand the scope of environmental auditing, which, EPA has concluded,  resulted in

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A U.S. District Court  for the District of Columbia has joined the debate regarding whether the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is required to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (NEPA), when designating critical habitat based upon the requirements of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). A geographically based distinction in agency policy has resulted from a split in the U.S. Courts of Appeals on the question of whether an environmental impact statement (EIS) is required for critical habitat designations. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Catron County Board of Commissioners, New Mexico, v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al., 75 F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996), held that the Fish and Wildlife Service must comply with NEPA when designating critical habitat under the ESA. 75 F.3d at 1436. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Douglas County v. Babbitt, et al., 48 F.3d 1495, 1502-07 (9th Cir. 1999), held that the Fish and Wildlife Service does not have to comply with NEPA when designating critical habitat. NEPA is generally understood to be a “procedural statute” that is designed to ensure that federal agencies make fully informed and well-considered decisions. While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit has not had an occasion to rule on this NEPA issue, on November 13, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a Memorandum Opinion agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that NEPA is not applicable to critical habitat determinations. The case is Otay Mesa Property, L.P., v. United States Department of the Interior.  Continue Reading ›

Recently the Third Circuit delivered an important message: Exploiting the permitting process to obstruct competitor growth will not shield one from antitrust claims. In mid-November, the Third Circuit considered whether a party can suffer an antitrust injury when a competitor uses the governmental permitting process to “frustrate the entry” of the competitor into the marketplace.  Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC, v. Village Supermarkets, Inc., et al. is a case involving a developer’s antitrust claims premised on numerous administrative and court challenges to its permit applications. Vacating the lower court’s ruling, in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s view of antitrust injury was too narrow and that Hanover “can establish that its injury was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct.” The Court of Appeals also held that Hanover sufficiently alleged that the defendants activity “was undertaken without regard to the merits of the claims and for the purpose of using the governmental process to restrain trade.” Accordingly to the Court of Appeals, Hanover can demonstrate that the defendants are not protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity because their conduct falls within the exception for sham litigation. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).

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Contractors should beware that the Sixth Circuit’s guidance on CERCLA-related topics continues to be murky, including, in particular, what constitutes a CERCLA settlement triggering the running of the 3-year limitations period for contribution claims. On November 5, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a ruling in the case of Florida Power Corp., dba Progress Energy Florida, Inc., v. FirstEnergy Corp., interpreting two Administrative Orders by Consent for Remedial Investigation/ Feasibility Study (AOCs). The Court of Appeals held that the AOCs were not CERCLA settlements and, as a result, Florida Power’s contribution claims were not untimely. There is a significant dissent in this case, and all of the judges appear to agree that the Sixth Circuit’s decisions in this area have not provided adequate guidance to the regulated community.

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